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With Germany’s banking sector still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, 
public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained 
steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a bad bank plan from the German 
Institute for Economic Research. The key element of the plan is the valuation of 
troubled assets at their current market value—assets with no market would thus be 
valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depre-
ciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets’ current book value 
and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility 
for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize 
the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a 
takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment 
would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear 
emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The gov-
ernment would cover the bad bank’s losses, while profits would be distributed to the 
distressed bank’s current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the 
government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad 
bank for each systemically relevant banking institute.
Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but 
rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. 
It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. 
At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, 
the risk of moral hazard is curtailed.
Public discussion concerning the structural dislocation of the global financial system 
continues unabated. With the escalation of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008, 
many economists advocated internationally coordinated steps to recapitalize the 
banking sector. The recapitalization of distressed banks via public funds as well 
as the creation of bad banks for toxic assets were both proposed early on, yet the 
international community continues to debate potential solutions.1 While a general 
1 cf. Zimmermann, K. F. 2008: “Coordinating International Responses to the Crisis”, in Eichengreen, B., B. Richard 
(eds.), Rescuing Our Jobs and Savings: What G7/8 Leaders Can Do to Solve the Global Credit Crisis. The booklet is 
published on http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2340 and is documented in German in Schäfer, D. (Ed.): 
Finanzmärkte im Umbruch: Krise und Neugestaltung, Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 1-2009, DIW Ber-
lin, pp. 167-209. Zimmermann, K. F. et al.: Europas Bankenkrise: Ein Aufruf zum Handeln. Führende Ökonomen rufen German Bad Bank Plan
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consensus on the principles for the reorganization 
of global financial markets was reached at the G-20 
conference in Washington D.C. on November 15, 
2008, the implementation of concrete measures was 
not addressed until the G-20 conference in London 
on April 2, 2009.
Efforts to master the crisis have fallen short so far. 
Measures have been primarily implemented at a 
national level, if they have been implemented at all. 
As in many other countries, the bank rescue pack-
age in Germany has only been partially successful. 
The package’s provisions for the sale of toxic assets 
have hardly been taken advantage of to date. The 
debate in Germany concerning the structural reforms 
necessary as a result of the crisis has drawn renewed 
attention to existing weaknesses such as the question 
of whether Germany needs another internationally 
competitive mega-bank or the still unresolved is-
sue of the economic purpose of the 7 federal state 
banks (Landesbanken). These public banks are part-
ly owned by either one or several German federal 
states and partly by savings banks.
Against this backdrop, it seems advisable to main-
tain a clear separation between the plans for the 
removal of toxic assets and the plans to address 
other structural issues. The necessary structural 
adjustments must soon be implemented at private 
and public banks; German banks must quickly re-
gain their function as institutes which serve the real 
economy and as sources of credit, in order to coun-
teract the cyclical downturn. At the same time, the 
creation of bad banks is becoming ever more neces-
sary. The government must confront the problems 
at hand with a proactive industrial policy so that it 
can retreat from interventionist measures as quickly 
as possible.
A Weak Capital Basis
The capital bases of German banks are seriously 
endangered by the high quarterly write-down of 
asset values. A lasting return of confidence cannot 
be expected without the removal of the troubled 
securitized assets plaguing the system, which largely 
have their origin in the US mortgage markets. Figure 
1 displays equity capital to assets and core capital 
ratios (in percent) for a selection of large banks. 
Figure 2 displays this data for a selection of German 
federal state banks (Landesbanken). Some of these 
banks have already accepted government assistance 
Europa zu schnellem Vorgehen in der Finanzmarktkrise auf. Documented 
in the same issue, pp. 210-212. Sachverständigenrat: Jahresgutachten 






















Leverage measured as 
equity capital to assets
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in order to stay above the minimum core capital 
ratio of 4 percent.2
According to the Bundesbank, the total capital in-
cluding reserves held by all German banks is ap-
proximately 415 billion euros.3 Estimates of the 
total incurred losses from toxic assets vary at pres-
ent between 200 and 300 billion euros—in other 
words, between 8 and 12 percent of German GDP. 
During the Swedish bank crisis in the early 1990s, 
write-downs amounted to more than 12 percent of 
GDP. Losses of this magnitude—by no means unre-
alistic in the present crisis—would seriously erode 
the capital bases of German banks.
Capital Shortages Limit the Ability 
of Banks to Provide Credit
The worsening capital position of the banks has a 
number of consequences with destabilizing feed-
backs for financial markets and the real economy. 
Regulatory authorities in Germany are forced to 
close a bank if its core capital ratio falls below 4 
percent. The threat of imminent bank closures is 
a source of insecurity for market participants and 
isolates the affected banks from capital flows. In 
addition, banks are forced to limit the amount of 
credit they provide if they lack the necessary equity 
capital. This increases the chances that companies 
outside the banking sector will have excessive dif-
ficulty obtaining credit for their operations. The 
US savings & loan crisis in the 1980s demonstrated 
that under the threat of bankruptcy, managers of 
over-indebted banks are prone to risky behavior in 
attempt to rescue their institutions from failure.4 
Such risky behavior is known as “gambling for res-
urrection”. It may be encouraged by the fact that 
limited liability saves bank managers from incurring 
potential losses themselves.5
2 Following the intensification of the financial crisis, many experts have 
advocated that a bank’s core capital should comprise at least ten percent 
of its risk-adjusted assets. Financial experts view an equity capital to as-
sets relationship of 4 to 5%, and thus a leverage ratio of 25:1 and 20:1, 
as acceptable for a credit institute. In recent years, leverage ratios of 30:1 
for hedge funds have been normal. Nine months before its was shut down 
by the government in January 1998, the US hedge fund Long Term Ca-
pital Management had a leverage ratio of 25:1 (see https://treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf, p.12).
3 Consolidated balance sheet for German monetary financial institutions 
(MFIs) from the German central bank’s European System of Accounts (see 
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/statistik/bankenstatistik/
S101ATIB01013.PDF).
4 cf. Federal Deposit Insurance: The Banking Crises of the 1980s and 
Early 1990s: Summary and Implications, www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/
history/3_85.pdf,  see http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/ 
(last update 6/5/2000).
5 Freixas, X., B. M. Parigi, J.-C. Rochet. 2003: The Lender of Last Resort: 
A 21st Century Approach, Working Paper Series 298, European Central 
Bank.
The Bad Bank Solution
The creation of one or more bad banks represents 
a way of overcoming this dilemma.6 A bad bank 
purchases or takes over troubled loans or securi-
ties and then attempts to restructure and manage 
these assets in a way that maximizes their value. 
Once the banks are freed from troubled assets and 
the need to constantly write down asset values, the 
negative effects associated with the threat of bank-
ruptcy, a reduction in lending due to a lack of capital, 
and the readiness to take risks at the expense of 
creditors and the general public can be minimized 
or eliminated. However, bad banks do have two 
drawbacks. First, capital is needed to create a bad 
bank—potentially in very large amounts. Second, 
there may be considerable losses at the end of a bad 
bank’s life. Additional costs will result if the condi-
tions for the purchase of toxic assets represent an 
incentive for banks to rely on government bailouts 
in the future. Historical examples show a wide 
spectrum of different variants of bad banks. The 
particular plan that is selected determines the cur-
rent and future expenses borne by taxpayers when 
the bad bank is established.
Historical Examples of Bad Banks
The special handling of troubled assets is not un-
common in the day-to-day activities of the bank-
ing world. For example, non-performing corpo-
rate loans are typically transferred to a work-out 
department. In the case of large loan amounts, the 
individual lenders form creditor pools in order to 
prevent coordination failures and a sudden with-
drawal of lenders that can force a financially dis-
tressed firm into bankruptcy.7 In the past, work-outs 
have often resulted in loans being converted into 
share capital.8 A bad bank is essentially a work-
out department on a much larger scale. When the 
illiquid assets on the banking industry’s books 
endanger the entire financial system, a bad bank 
has often been the solution of choice.
At the end of the 1980s, more than 1,000 savings & 
loan institutions in the United States were threatened 
by insolvency due to financing with divergent matu-
6 Zimmermann, K. F. 2009: Letzter Ausweg bad bank? Commentary in 
Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin No. 6/2009.
7 Brunner, A. and J. P. Krahnen. 2008: “Multiple Lenders and Corporate 
Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring”, Review of Economic Studies 
75(2), pp. 415-442. Hubert, F. and D. Schäfer. 2002: “Coordination Fail-
ure with Multiple Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful 
Lender”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 158(2), p. 
256ff.
8 Schäfer, D. 2003: “Die „Geiselhaft“ des Relationship-Intermediärs: Eine 
Nachlese zur Beinahe-Insolvenz des Holzmann-Konzerns”, Perspektiven 
der Wirtschaftspolitik, 4(1), pp. 65-84.German Bad Bank Plan
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rity dates in connection with high interest rates for 
depositors but comparatively low rates on mortgage 
lending.9 In 1989, the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC)—a bad bank—was founded. The RTC was 
set up with government funding and to a limited 
extent with money from private investors. Between 
1989 and 1995, the RTC took over 747 bankrupt 
S&Ls with a book value of 394 billion dollars. The 
S&L bailout cost US taxpayers a total of 124 billion 
dollars, 76 billion of which fell to the RTC.10
In the early 1990s, Sweden attempted to master 
its banking crisis with several asset management 
companies. The two most important bad banks—
Securum and Retriva—were set up by the Swedish 
government. Some 3,000 non-performing loans that 
had been extended to 1,274 troubled companies 
were transferred from Nordbanken—which had 
been completely taken over by the government—
to Securum. This corresponded to 21 percent of the 
bank’s asset portfolio. Retriva, for its part, took over 
45% of Gota Bank’s assets shortly after the bank 
was nationalized.11
Nordbanken, which took over Gota Bank in 1993, is 
known today as Nordea Bank, of which the Swedish 
government still holds a 19.9 % stake.12 In 2007, 
the revenues from several sources, dividends, sell-
ing of stock and a rising value of the government’s 
remaining equity stake, finally offset the cost of the 
bailout. That the bailout eventually paid for itself 
is attributable to the success of Sweden’s bad bank 
plan in minimizing losses on troubled assets.13
In 2001, a Berlin bank known as the Berliner 
Bankgesellschaft was threatened with bankruptcy 
due to the returns it had guaranteed to real-estate 
fund investors. The city-state of Berlin prevented 
the closure of the bank’s holding company—
which also owned Berlin‘s federal state bank 
(Landesbank) and savings bank (Sparkasse)—by 
taking control of it and providing credit guar-
antees worth over 21.6 billion euros.14
9 More than 1,600 banks went bankrupt or required government assis-
tance between 1980 and 1994.
10 Curry T. and L. Shibut. 2000: The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: 
Truth and Consequences, FDIC Banking Review, www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf.
11 Ingves, S. and G. Lind. 1996: The Management of the Bank Crisis—in 
Retrospect, Quarterly Review  Sveriges Riksbank 1/1996, pp. 5-18.
12  See  http://www.nordea.com/Investor%2bRelations/Nordea%2b 
share/Shareholders/85732.html (access  on the 5th of May 2009).
13 Ketzler, R. and D. Schäfer. 2009: Nordische Bankenkrisen der 90er 
Jahre: Gemischte Erfahrungen mit „Bad Banks“, Wochenbericht des DIW 
Berlin No. 5/2009, pp 87-99.
14 The city-state of Berlin provided 87.5% of the necessary capital in-
crease of 2 billion euros. Berlin thus increased its stake from 56.6% to 
80.95%. Parion, an insurer, saw its stake reduce following the capital in-
crease to 2.27% (from 7.5%). The percentage of free-floating shares fell 
from 15.89% to 5.93% following the capital increase. www.manager-
In 2006, the newly founded Berliner Immobilien 
Holding (BIH) took over several troubled real-estate 
funds.15 The former Berliner Bankgesellschaft was 
thus effectively separated into a bad bank (BIH) 
and good bank (Landesbank Berlin). In 2007, the 
city-state of Berlin managed to sell its 81% stake 
in the Landesbank Berlin for 4.7 billion euros. BIH 
has hitherto invested some two billion euros in the 
re-purchase of shares and the refurbishment and 
improvement of its properties.16 Additional invest-
ments are planned. The goal is to make its property 
inventory so attractive that potential buyers will 
be willing to take over the guarantees provided by 
Berlin.
Yet in recent years, ailing institutions have also 
made use of bad banks as a method for repairing 
the balance sheets without governmental interfer-
ence. Between 2003 and 2005, Dresdner Bank 
transferred 35.5 billion euros in toxic loans and 
shares which had lost strategic relevance to a so-
called Institutional Restructuring Unit (IRU).17 In 
2008, WestLB, the Landesbank partially owned 
by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, founded a 
consolidation vehicle named “Phoenix” in Dublin, 
Ireland. As an off-balance-sheet special purpose 
vehicle (without a banking license), Phoenix has 
already taken over assets with a book value of 23 
billion euros. The owners have guaranteed these 
assets for five billion euros.18 In total, WestLB is 
planning to hive off assets with a book value of 
some 80 billion euros.19
Prerequisites for the Success of a 
Bad Bank 
Realistically, it must be assumed that a bad bank 
will produce a loss in the end. If these losses remain 
low, they can be more readily compensated for by an 
appreciation in value in other areas—for example, 
magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/0,2828,160057,00.html.
15 According to an article in the February 2007 issue of the German 
magazine “Berliner Wirtschaft,” the takeover was finalized for the sym-
bolic sum of one euro. The takeover included 29 closed funds with an 
original investment value of approximately 10 billion euros and more 
than 500 properties. The holding company had 26 employees including 
managers, while the real-estate investment companies controlled by the 
holding company employed a total of 517 people, www.bih-holding.de/
bih/aktuelles/BlnWirtschaft_BIH_Febr2007.jpg.
16 cf. Börsen-Zeitung dated October 2, 2008. Berlin startet Verkauf der 




18 Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired 
Assets in the Community Banking Sector, Annex 2, http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/impaired_assets.pdf.
19 According to Irish press reports, Dublin was selected due to tax con-
siderations and the local availability of financial and restructuring exper-
tise.German Bad Bank Plan
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through the increased worth of a government stake 
in the rescued banks. The government has a good 
chance of recouping its investment in a bad bank if 
the following prerequisites are fulfilled:
Troubled assets have been purchased/taken over  •	
at a low price
Active management of these assets is possible •	
Financial experts are involved who know how  •	
to deal with such assets
Time is available •	
A clear governance structure has been implemented  •	
If a market price for an asset does not exist, then the 
bank being relieved of the asset has an informational 
edge over the buyer. In this state of affairs, “lemon 
market” effects are likely. An ailing bank will only 
transfer assets to a bad bank which have a value 
below the agreed-upon average price.20 As a result, 
the bad bank pays inflated prices and generates 
losses. In this scenario, an excessive burden is also 
borne by the taxpayer in the recapitalization of the 
banking sector.
Active management necessitates the restructuring 
of the acquired assets. This includes conducting 
negotiations with debtors, debt rescheduling and, if 
necessary, debt reductions in order to avoid default. 
Clearly identifiable and accessible partners in the 
negotiation process are thus essential for the effec-
tive management of troubled assets.
Another key element in this regard is the creation 
of attractive investment packages for potential buy-
ers, possibly with government financial support. If 
the government does not have sufficient access to 
specialized knowledge for the effective restructuring 
and management of assets, taxpayers may be forced 
to cover disproportionately high losses, despite a 
purchase price that accurately reflects the underlying 
value of the illiquid assets. Generally, the acquisition 
of financial experts for the formation of a bad bank 
is no simple task, as there is a shortage of individuals 
with the requisite expertise, even at the international 
level. The pool of individuals with experience in 
managing troubled assets is small.21
Fire sales to cover a shortage of liquidity may place 
downward pressure on asset prices and minimize 
20 Akerlof, G. A. 1970: “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), pp. 
488-500.
21 The shortage of qualified experts is demonstrated by the recurrent in-
volvement of Jan E. Kvarnström, the former director of the Swedish bank 
Securum. He managed Dresdner Bank‘s IRU; according to press reports, 
worked on behalf of the German government to manage the sale of KfW’s 
stake in IKB; and helped to manage six billion euros in structured securi-
ties held by IKB, cf. von Buttlar, H. and N. Luttmer. 2009: Der schwedische 
Bankenlotse, Financial Times Deutschland, 24 January.
sale proceeds. If a bad bank lacks sufficient capital 
to wait for an opportune moment to sell its assets, 
it will incur unnecessarily high losses. Excessive 
costs for taxpayers can also be expected if a clear 
governance structure has not been defined (for de-
cision-making, monitoring and accountability). The 
executive managers in charge of a bad bank should 
be able to conduct operations and make decisions 
regarding the sale or restructuring of assets autono-
mously, and without being absorbed by issues that 
only arise because of conflicts of interest between 
the government and banks.
Methods of Capitalization and 
Organizational Models
The amount of capitalization required by a bad bank 
is essentially determined by two factors: operating 
costs and acquisition costs. When a low price is 
paid for the acquired troubled assets, this not only 
minimizes the risk of future losses but also keeps the 
initial capital requirements of the bad bank low.
The source of financing determines whether the 
government or private sector provides the required 
start-up funding. The need for liquid funds depends 
on how the banks being freed of their troubled assets 
will be “paid.” Liquid funding is not immediately 
required if a “payment” is made with government 
securities. However, in this regard the amount of the 
write-downs and a possible need to re-capitalize the 
bank are contingent upon whether the book value of 
the distressed assets exceeds the book value of the 
government securities provided in exchange.
If the government provides 100% of the financing—
whether in the form of liquid capital or government 
securities—future losses suffered by the bad bank 
must be borne first by the taxpayer. The greater the 
amount paid initially for the troubled assets, the 
higher the risk of future losses. The participation of 
the private sector in absorbing these losses can be 
achieved through negotiation once the bad bank’s 
final operating result is forthcoming. Alternatively, 
fixed terms for the distribution of losses can be 
agreed upon in advance. Such terms cannot fore-
close all possibility of future renegotiation, however. 
In this way, the government is subject to the hold-
up problem. This latent threat of potential ex post 
exploitation rises in direct relation to the amount 
of funding initially provided to establish the bad 
bank.22
22 The “hold-up problem” is a term that is known from contract theory 
and from behavioral finance. See Williamson, O. E. 1979: “Transaction-
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”, Journal of 
Law and Economics 22(2), pp. 233-62.German Bad Bank Plan
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A bad bank plan can be implemented in a centralized 
or decentralized manner. Under a decentralized plan, 
each troubled bank is split into its own good and 
bad bank. Under a centralized plan, all distressed 
assets in the banking sector are deposited in a single 
bad bank. If one bad bank were established for each 
of the three main pillars of the German banking 
industry—i.e. for the credit unions, savings banks 
and private banks—this would also qualify as a 
centralized bad bank plan. Mixed solutions that 
combine private and public sector funding as well as 
centralized and decentralized organizational features 
are also conceivable.
Classification of Historical 
Precedents and Proposed Models
The table organizes known bad bank examples 
and current proposals according to the source of 
capitalization and organizational form. As the 
table shows, the majority of known bad banks have 
been established based on a decentralized organiza-
tional model. Retriva and Securum (Sweden) as 
well as BIH (Berlin) were founded through the 
subdivision of a bank threatened with insolvency 
into a good and bad bank. In all three of these 
cases, the government provided the funding for the 
bad bank and also recapitalized the good bank in 
exchange for a shareholder stake.
In each case, the distressed assets were also trans-
ferred to the bad bank in a single transaction. This 
effectively circumvented the need to engage in sub-
sequent negotiations for the distribution of bailout 
costs. At the same time, a government stake in the 
good bank is necessary for losses to be recouped 
and for the possibility of a net taxpayer gain, or at 
least to break even, further down the road.
The Prerequisites for Success with 
Securum, Retriva and BIH
Sweden’s bad banks, Securum and Retriva, man-
aged to limit losses on non-performing assets. A 
successful resolution also appears to be on the 
horizon for Berliner Immobilien Holding.23 With 
the application of the principle that the stockhold-
ers should bear losses first, it was possible to se-
cure relatively low prices for the acquired assets. 
This circumvented potential “lemon market” effects. 
At the same time, there were no incentives estab-
lished for shareholders to rely on the expectation of 
23 The amount of money still to be invested in order to make the proper-
ties of BIH attractive enough for potential buyers is estimated to remain 
lower than the proceeds from the sale of Landesbank Berlin.
government assistance in the future. The partners 
involved in negotiations for the restructuring of the 
troubled assets were clearly identifiable and acces-
sible, ensuring that assets could be managed actively 
and effectively. In Sweden and Berlin, the govern-
ment drew on the expertise of external consultants 
with distressed asset management experience. The 
allocation of sufficient funding prevented the pre-
mature sale of assets at prices below their future 
market value. As both the good and bad banks were 
partially or completely in government hands in each 
case, no conflict of interest developed between the 
government and private banks. For this reason, it can 
be assumed that the management had considerable 
autonomy over operative decisions.
Proposed Models for the Current Crisis
The gray boxes designate proposed models for 
the current crisis. As the table shows, the propos-
als under discussion are all of a “mixed” form. In 
the US, the Geithner plan relies on public-private 
partnerships for the purchase of toxic assets. The 
Table
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original US plan foresaw the creation of a cen-
tral fund for the acquisition of distressed assets. 
The   latest proposals involve numerous funds with 
mixed financing that may compete with each other 
to acquire assets from individual banks and govern-
ment share capital.24
The proposal made by the Association of German 
Banks (BdB), in which an account would be set 
up for each bank in need of assistance, is aimed at 
establishing a government-funded bad bank with a 
mixed organizational structure. It must be noted, 
however, that mixed solutions are particularly 
susceptible to conflicts of interest and unclear 
governance structures.
Model for a Public Bad Bank
Objectives
A public bad bank must be in a position to address 
numerous challenges. First, the transparent removal 
of troubled assets is necessary in order to ensure that 
the rescued bank has real prospects for a fresh start. 
Second, the costs of the bailout for the taxpayer 
should be minimized. Third, no incentives or new 
opportunities for opportunistic behavior in the future 
should be created. To do this, the implemented bad 
bank model should limit the potential for “hold-
up” problems while emphasizing to shareholders 
and executives that entrepreneurial failure is a real 
possibility.
The toxic assets currently plaguing the German 
banking system are for the most part complex 
mortgage-backed securities originating in the US 
housing market. The anonymity of the US-based 
original borrowers and the large number of inter-
mediate institutions involved in the packaging and 
onward sale of these securities represent serious 
impediments to the identification of the relevant 
counterparties for debt restructuring. Hence, there 
are fewer instruments available for restricting the 
bad bank’s losses than in the past. Basically, the 
tools are limited to the purchase price, the securing 
of additional time to sell assets at an opportune 
moment and the governance structure. 
Key Elements of a Bad Bank Plan
The selected bad bank plan should consist of the 
following key elements in order to address the chal-
lenges:
24  Bebchuk, L. 2009: Jump-Starting the Market for Troubled Assets, 
www.forbes.com/2009/03/03/troubled-assets-relief-opinions-contri-
butors_bad_bank.html.  
Troubled assets should be valued based on  •	
current market prices prior to their takeover by 
the bad bank. Troubled assets for which there is 
no market should be transferred to the bad bank 
at a zero price and therefore at zero cost for the 
government as the bad bank’s sponsor.
The government should recapitalize the rescued  •	
bank (the remaining good bank) through the ac-
quisition of a shareholder stake; in extreme cases, 
the remaining good bank should be taken over 
by the government.
The bad bank should be funded by the govern- •	
ment. External experts should be entrusted with 
the management and future sale of the troubled 
assets at the government’s expense. If a profit 
remains after the proceeds from holding the 
troubled assets until expiration date and/or sel-
ling them to the market have materialized and 
operating costs have been deducted, these pro-
fits should be distributed to the former share-
holders.
The government should announce its commit- •	
ment to the future re-privatization of its stake 
in the rescued bank. When establishing a bad 
bank, the government should make a binding 
commitment to how long it has to sell its shares 
in the good bank following the closure of the 
bad bank.
All “systemically relevant” banks should be iden- •	
tified and required to participate in the plan.
The takeover of toxic assets by the government 
at zero cost and the corresponding write-down of 
assets will create transparency, avoid the high ex-
pense of pricing distressed assets, and will insure 
that shareholders are the first ones to bear the cost 
of failure.25 The risk of moral hazard will also be 
effectively limited. A zero-cost acquisition is also 
justified based on the fact that the active manage-
ment of the troubled assets is impaired by their com-
plex structure. This approach will also keep the bad 
bank’s initial capital requirements at a minimum.
With the value of their toxic assets written down 
to zero, a number of banks will no longer meet the 
legislated core capital requirement. The government 
should take a stake in these banks in order to recapi-
talize them. The prior removal of troubled assets 
will limit the risk taken on by the government and 
provide good prospects for the appreciation of its 
investment. The government’s risk of loss (through 
the bad bank) and opportunity for success (through 
25 The European Commission has proposed valuing the troubled assets 
prior to their transfer on the basis of their inherent value. This would be a 
very difficult task, however, due to the complexity of the assets. Commu-
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the rescued good bank) would thus be clearly separated from one another. This 
would also contribute to transparency.
The government should bear the costs of running the bad bank and ensure that 
sufficient capital is available so that assets can be held until their date of maturity 
or an opportune moment for their sale. The risk of exploitation for the party pro-
viding the initial capital would be limited by the acquisition of the assets at zero 
cost. The rule that profits of the bad bank should be returned would ensure that the 
former shareholders are not forced to suffer any unfair losses from the transfer of 
the troubled assets to the bad bank.26 In addition, proceeds from the resale of the 
government’s stake in the rescued bank would be used to cover the taxpayer’s initial 
investment for recapitalizing the good banks and for possible losses incurred by the 
bad bank. In this case, the government would have no incentive to delay the resale 
of the stake it had taken in the rescued bank.
At the very most, the amount of funding that the government will need to provide 
to recapitalize the banking sector will equal the losses that accrue from the write-
down of troubled assets—i.e. somewhere between 200 and 300 billion euros for 
Germany. The one-off set-up costs and annual operating costs for the bad bank 
have to be added to this.
Conclusion
Under the terms of the plan, a bad bank and nationalization are not mutually ex-
clusive alternatives but rather two separate policy options that complement one 
another. The plan avoids mixed proposals with unclear governance structures and 
uncertainties about the banks’ capacity of raising a sufficient volume of capital. The 
question as to whether a single bank or multiple bad banks should be established is 
of secondary importance provided the basic plan selected ensures that: (1) distressed 
banks are freed of troubled assets and are given a fresh start; (2) the taxpayer is 
not unnecessarily burdened; and (3) moral hazard and other negative incentives 
are avoided. Furthermore, in order to provide a foundation for the rescued banks 
to pursue a sustainable business model, a new regulatory framework for capital 
markets must be enacted.
Historically, most bank plans have followed a decentralized model (i.e. multiple 
bad banks). The total assets of the systemically relevant banks currently impacted 
by the crisis and the oft-cited heterogeneity of the toxic assets plaguing the system 
also lead to the belief that no benefits of scale would be gained by a centralized 
bad bank solution. To implement the plan and bailout the banking system, the 
government will need a considerable volume of capital immediately, which is the 
primary drawback of the plan.
26 This idea also forms the basis of the debtor warrant in the Bundesbank’s proposed model. If the shareholders have 
in fact surrendered the assets at a price lower than their market value, they can recover the difference through a debtor 
warrant.